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Reinforcement of Middle Level Review Regarding
Gender Classifications: Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the United States
Supreme Court was presented with an equal protection challenge initiated
by a male who was denied admission to a state-supported all-female
school of nursing. After a review of relevant decisions in this area, the au-
thor examines the Supreme Court's intermediate level of scrutiny analysis
and argues that application of a higher level of scrutiny to gender-based
classifications is a prerequisite to true equality between the sexes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court struck down its first gender-
based classification in 1971 on equal protection grounds.' Since
that time, the Court has struggled with gender challenges, apply-
ing a variety of standards of review with minimal consistency.
In certain areas, the Court employs a permissive review, the ra-
tional basis test,2 which requires only that the challenged statute
bear some rational relation to a legitimate state goal.3 This stan-
1. Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court traditionally applied only a minimum ra-
tionality test. See infra notes 2-4, 37-40 and accompanying text. In Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court finally departed from its posture of utmost deference
to political judgments respecting the role of women. In Reed, the Court unani-
mously invalidated an Idaho statute requiring, as between persons "equally enti-
tled" to administer a decedent's estate, that "males must be preferred to females."
Id. at 73; see infra notes 41-4" and accompanying text.
2. The rational basis standard was clarified in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), as follows:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws,
but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and
therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable
basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some ine-
quality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry
the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but
is essentially arbitrary.
Id. at 78-79.
3. See L. TRIBE, THE CONSTrrurIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 996
dard is extremely deferential to the legislature and usually re-
sults in the upholding of the challenged statute.4 On the other
hand, the Court has engaged in a more active review,5 requiring
that the statute be directly designed to achieve compelling state
interests.6 Unfortunately, the Court has generally refused to ap-
ply the strict test to gender-based classifications, '7 thereby neces-
sitating the emergence of a middle-level review. 8 Accordingly,
(1978) (noting the leniency and deference which the courts give to the state in rec-
ognizing "legitimate" state objectives).
4. Until the early 1970's, which saw the emergence of intermediate scrutiny,
the Supreme Court upheld sexually discriminatory laws whenever they could be
rationally related to government purposes, thereby reflecting the traditional views
of the "proper" relationship between men and women in American society.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), said it
concisely:
Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to dis-
tinguish between male and female ... for too much of our history there
was the same inertia in distinguishing between black and white. But that
sort of stereotyped reaction may have no rational relationship-other than
pure prejudicial discrimination-to the stated purpose for which the clas-
sification is being made.
Id. at 520-21 (footnote omitted).
Mathews v. Lucas involved an attack on a provision in the Social Security Act
which required illegitimate children claiming survivors' benefits from a deceased
parent to prove their dependency on that parent. There was no similar require-
ment for legitimate children. Gender-based and legitimacy-based classifications
typically received the same level of judicial scrutiny. The statute was held to be
constitutionally valid.
5. This is called "strict scrutiny." It acknowledges that other political
choices-those burdening fundamental rights or suggesting a classification based
on race or other classifications of minority groups-must be subjected to close
analysis in order to preserve substantial values of equality and liberty. See Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a statute requiring forced
sterilization for habitual criminals because the statute excluded certain offenses
that were similar to others not excluded). See generally Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969) (providing discus-
sion of both the minimum and strict standards of review) [hereinafter cited as
Developments ].
6. "[S Iuspect classifications can be sustained only when the State bears the
burden of demonstrating that the challenged legislation serves overriding or com-
pelling interests that cannot be achieved either by a more carefully tailored legis-
lative classification or by the use of feasible, less drastic means." Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. With only one exception (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plu-
rality holding)), the Supreme Court has consistently failed to recognize sex as a
suspect class, thereby immunizing sexual classifications from strict scrutiny analy-
sis. The pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) must be considered as
one key factor in the Court's reluctance to apply such a test. As Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Frontiero indicates, the Court should defer such a decision
to consider gender-based classifications as "suspect" until the "Will of the people"
is established. 441 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring). For further discussion of
the ERA and suspect classifications, see infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
8. Intermediate level scrutiny was introduced in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), where the Court struck down a statute restricting the purchase of bever-
ages containing a certain percentage of alcohol by males under age 21, but did not
prohibit their consumption. Females of ages 18 to 21 could not only consume the
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this "in-between" test has recently been applied by the Court in
numerous cases, placing the burden on the state to show that the
statute bears a substantial relation to important government
purposes.9
Although the middle-level standard appears on its face to be
clearly defined, actual application to gender-based challenges has
continually fluctuated. This is due, in part, to disagreements as to
the roles and abilities of males and females, coupled with a de-
sire, by at least some members of the Court, to continue its role
as benevolent protector.1O
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan"l presented the
Court with an equal protection challenge initiated by a man who
was denied admission to a state-supported all-women's school of
nursing. The Hogan Court utilized a rigorous application of mid-
dle-level review,12 symbolizing the current status of benign gen-
der-based challenges and acknowledging middle-level review as
the norm. The decision was not, however, without strong dis-
sents1 3 reflecting paternalistic and traditional attitudes towards
sex discrimination.' 4
This note will analyze how constitutional and statutory chal-
lenges to gender-based discrimination have created differing
beverage, but they could also purchase it. Necessity for the new level of review is
discussed in Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Consti-
tutional Amendment?, 84 HAE.v. L. REV. 1499 (1971).
9. See generally infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 14.
11. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
12. The Court applied the substantial relationship test (middle-level of re-
view) set forth in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See in fra notes 64-66 and ac-
companying text.
13. See infra note 22.
14. This oft-quoted passage from Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell v.
State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (denying female's right to practice law), exem-
plifies the concept of "romantic paternalism":
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as
in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which prop-
erly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony,
not to say the identity, of interests and views which belong, or should be-
long, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopt-
ing a distinct and independent career from that of her husband .... The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and be-
nign offices of wife and mother. This is the Law of the Creator.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
equal protection standards. Additionally, it will explore the devel-
opment of the middle-level standard of equal protection review
used by the Court in Hogan and the importance of its objective
application, free from preconceived notions of traditional stereo-
types. Such application is essential to reinforce the Court's com-
mitment to eradicate invidious sexual discrimination. The
movement towards sexual equality is dependent, at present, on
strengthened intermediate scrutiny because the Supreme Court
has refused to treat gender as a suspect class,' 5 and because of
the fate of the long-awaited Equal Rights Amendment.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Mississippi University for Women (MUW) was created by
the Mississippi Legislature in 188416 and, until 1982, was the oldest
state-supported all-female college in the United States. In 1971,
MUW established a School of Nursing in Columbus which pres-
ently offers both a four-year baccalaureate program and a gradu-
ate program in nursing.17
In 1979, Joe Hogan, a registered male nurse employed in a Co-
lumbus medical center, applied for admission to the MUW School
of Nursing baccalaureate program in order to receive training as a
nurse-anesthetist. He was denied admission solely on the basis of
gender.18 Hogan fied an action in federal court claiming that
MUW's single-sex admission policy violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The district court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the single-sex policy was ration-
ally related to the state's legitimate interest in providing "the
greatest practical range of educational opportunities for its female
student population."' 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that an intermediate level of review was re-
quired in all gender-based classifications 20 and that the state had
failed to show a "substantial relationship" to an important gov-
15. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
16. 1884 Miss. Laws, ch. XXX, § 6. The school was originally established as the
Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White Girls of the
State of Mississippi.
17. 458 U.S. at 720.
18. Id.
19. Petition for Certiorari at A3, Hogan, 458 U.S. at 718. In dismissing the com-
plaint, the district court applied the "rational relationship" test (minimum level of
scrutiny).
20. Hogan v. Mississippi, Univ. for Women, 646 F.2d 1116, 1118 (5th Cir. 1981),
affd, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
"While at times in our history the impact of the Equal Protection Clause on
gender-based discrimination was less than clear, that is not so today. . . Gender-
based classifications must be substantially related to important governmental
objectives in order to withstand constitutional challenge." Id. at 1117-18.
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ernmental objective.21
In a five to four opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ordering
MUW to enroll Hogan in the School of Nursing.22 Since MUW's
admissions policy expressly discriminated on the basis of gen-
der,23 it necessitated a showing that the classification served
"'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed' were 'substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives.' "24
The Court found that the state's primary justification of com-
pensating women for past discrimination did not constitute an im-
portant government objective.25 In addition, a substantial
relationship was not found between the admissions policy and the
proposed objective. 26 The Court also rejected the state's argu-
ment that the language of the Education Amendments of 197227
21. Id. at 1119. The purported state interest was to provide the "greatest prac-
tical range of educational opportunities for its female student population." Id. at
1118.
While the district court concluded this to be a legitimate state interest, the
court of appeals held that Mississippi could not advance a justification for gender-
based discrimination. The appellate court noted that the important state purpose
was to provide education for all its citizens, and providing a unique opportunity
for females did not substantially relate to this important objective. Id. at 1119.
22. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined
in the majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun wrote separate dissenting opinions and Justice Powell filed a
dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying
text for discussion of Justice Powell's dissent.
23. 458 U.S. at 723.
24. Id. at 723 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150
(1980)).
25. See supra note 21; see infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. The Court
noted that the nursing profession was not a field where women had been denied
access in the past. Quite the opposite, the facts demonstrated that women domi-
nated the profession. 458 U.S. at 730.
26. See supra note 21; see infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. The Court
found that the discriminatory policy did not help women, but rather, it tended "to
perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." 458
U.S. at 729.
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1976). Section 1681 (a) states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance, except that:
(5) in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public in-
stitution of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that
traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of
admitting only students of one sex.
permits an institution which has traditionally and continually ad-
mitted only one sex to exist as it has in the past.2 8
III. BACKGROUND-CHALLENGES TO GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS
Within the last fifteen years, courts have been faced with an in-
creasing number of equal protection challenges to gender-based
classifications. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."2 9 Until
1976, the United States Supreme Court applied one of two tests to
determine whether a challenged classification was unconstitu-
tional:30 the rational basis test or the compelling state interest
test.
The rational basis test provides that the court apply minimum
scrutiny when determining the constitutionality of a classification.
The only requirement of this test is that the classification be "ra-
tionally related" to a legitimate state interest.3 1 In contrast, the
compelling state interest test provides for strict scrutiny. This
test requires the state to prove a "compelling" interest that is
achieved only through the challenged classification.32 Generally,
the strict scrutiny approach is applied to suspect classifications 33
and classifications impinging on fundamental rights.34 Few classi-
fications will withstand constitutional challenge when the strict
scrutiny analysis is employed.3 5 Since the adoption of the mini-
mum rationality test, however, all gender-based classifications are
capable of resisting constitutional attack.3 6
The Court's application of minimum scrutiny reflected the pre-
Id. (emphasis added).
28. 458 U.S. at 732; see supra note 27 for the text of the statute.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. See generally Developments, supra note 5, at 1076-1132, which provides a
discussion of these two standards.
31. See supra note 2; see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970)
(maximum ceiling on benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) is not unconstitutional even though it discriminates against large families
because it promotes employment and balances the equities between families on
welfare and poor families with an income from employment).
32. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. See also supra notes 5-6.
33. Suspect classifications seem to be limited to race and alienage. See, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 223 (1944) (ancestry).
34. Fundamental interests include the right to vote, access to the courts, and
the right to interstate travel. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627
(1969) (travel); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667.68 (1966) (vote);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 542 (procreation).
35. See generally TmE, supra note 3, at 1000 (recognizing the highest stan-
dard of review as "strict" in theory but "fatal" in fact).
36. Id. at 996 (noting the leniency and deference which the courts give to the
state in recognizing "legitimate" state objectives).
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vailing attitude "inherited" from the common law that a woman
had no distinct legal identity. 37 Early sex discrimination cases ap-
plying the rational basis test denied women the right to practice
law, 38 prevented women's name from being placed on a jury list,39
and forbade women from tending bar unless their father or hus-
band owned the tavern.4o
Not until 1971, in Reed v. Reed, 41 did the Supreme Court finally
strike down a statute which gave preference to males over fe-
males. The Idaho statute involved ordered the selection of a male
candidate for administrator of an estate whenever two candi-
dates-one male, one female-were equally qualified for the posi-
tion. The state objective asserted in defense of the statute was
one of administrative convenience-to reduce the workload of
probate courts by eliminating one class of contestants. The ma-
jority rejected this argument, deciding that such an arbitrary leg-
islative choice resulted in dissimilar treatment for men and
women who were similarly situated.42 Although the Court pur-
ported to apply a minimum scrutiny test, Reed has been consid-
ered to have marked the emergence of an intermediate form of
scrutiny.43
Two years after Reed, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opin-
ion, shifted its analysis in gender discrimination cases by apply-
37. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) ("Still again, history discloses
the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man"). See also supra note
14.
38. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872), discussed supra note
14; In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
39. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). Notwithstanding the "enlightened
emancipation of women," the Court found the classification reasonable in light of
the fact that the "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life."
Id. at 61-62.
40. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), disapproved, Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. at 210 n.23.
41. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed is one of only two unanimous gender discrimina-
tion decisions.
42. Id. at 77.
43. The Court stated that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of
either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, [was] to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by [equal protection]." Id. at 76. See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1063-64,
Comment, Sex Discrimination in the 1970's: The Supreme Court Decisions, 6 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 149, 153 (1974); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term - Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972) (evidencing "some special sensitivity to
sex as a classifying factor").
ing strict scrutiny. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 44 the Court struck
down an Air Force regulation providing that a female servicewo-
man must prove her husband's dependency to obtain housing and
medical benefits for him, whereas no such requirement was im-
posed on males. 45 A plurality of the Court characterized sex as a
suspect trait,46 thereby subjecting the classification to strict scru-
tiny. However, this standard of review has never been adopted by
a majority of the Court.47
The hope for a strict scrutiny analysis in sex discrimination
cases all but vanished in Kahn v. Shevin,48 where the Court re-
turned to an application of the rational basis test to uphold a be-
nign 49 gender-based classification. Kahn, a widower, was the first
male to challenge a Florida statute entitling only widows to a
property tax exemption.5 0 In upholding the statute,5 1 the Court
justified the gender discrimination as compensatory discrimina-
tion52 designed to recompense women for economic discrimina-
44. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
45. 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); 10 U.S.C. § 1072 (Supp. IV 1980).
46. Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall joined in the plurality opinion writ-
ten by Justice Brennan. The plurality noted:
[Slince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disa-
bilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would
seem to violate "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility .. " And what differ-
entiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical dis-
ability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contrib-
ute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often
have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to in-
ferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members.
411 U.S. at 686-87 (quoting Welser v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972) (footnote omitted)).
47. The Supreme Court's failure to treat gender as a suspect class may be ex-
plained in part by its reluctance to overstep what it conceives to be the bounds
between constitutional interpretation and a proposed constitutional amendment,
e.g., the ERA. See infra note 132.
48. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
49. Benign gender classifications evidence a remedial, protective purpose to
compensate women for past discrimination and may be in the nature of affirmative
action programs.
50. FLA. STAT. § 196.202 (Supp. 1983). The Florida statute states: "Property to
the value of five hundred dollars ($500) of every widow, blind person, or totally
and permanently disabled person who is a bona fide resident of this state shall be
exempt from taxation." Id.
51. In upholding the constitutionality of the Florida statute, the majority ap-
plied the Reed analysis claiming that "Florida's differing treatment of widows and
widowers 'rest[s] upon some ground of difference having afair and substantial re-
lation to the object of the legislation.'" 416 U.S. at 355 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. at 76) (emphasis added).
52. The state's purpose in enacting the statute was to diminish the financial
impact of spousal loss for the member of the sexual class suffering the greatest
[Vol. 11: 421, 19841 Gender Classifications
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tion in the marketplace. 53 In actuality, the Court's concept of
discriminatory compensation has been considered a step back-
wards in achieving equality due to the resulting reinforcements of
traditional perceptions of men and women.5 4 Similarly, in Schles-
inger v. Ballard,55 the rational basis test was again applied to up-
hold a federal military discharge statute5 6 which compensated
women for economic discrimination.5 7 However, the Court based
the differing treatment of male and female officers on the notion
that the genders were not similarly situated,5 8 thereby providing
some justification for upholding the disparate treatment5 9 under a
minimum scrutiny analysis.
The opinions of Kahn and Schlesinger suggested a tendency by
the Court to defer to legislative classifications with benign objec-
tives. However, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,60 the Court struck
down a social security provision that gave benefits to the widow
and minor children of a deceased male wage earner, but only to
the minor children of a deceased female wage earner.61 The
hardship. The Court noted that women had traditionally been economically disad-
vantaged, being denied all but the lowest paid jobs. 416 U.S. at 353.
53. Id. at 354-56.
54. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, Forward: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 100 (1975); see also Note, Preferential Economic
Treatment for Women: Some Constitutional and Practical Implications of Kahn v.
Shevin, 28 V.AD. L. REV. 843, 862 (1975).
55. 419 U.S. 498 (1974). In Ballard, a male lieutenant in the United States
Navy challenged a statute which mandated his discharge after a second attempt
and failure to obtain a promotion.
56. The law, 10 U.S.C. § 6:382(a) (1976) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 631
(Supp. IV 1980)), compels immediate discharge for all male officers who failed to
be promoted, but guaranteed female officers thirteen years of service before any
such mandatory discharge.
57. Women had substantially less opportunity for promotion when Congress
specifically declared that "women may not be assigned to duty in aircraft that are
engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to duty on vessels of the
Navy other than hospital ships or transports." 419 U.S. at 508 (quoting 10 U.S.C.
§ 6015 (1976)).
58. 419 U.S. at 508. See also supra note 57. The Court distinguished Ballard
from Reed and Frontiero in which the challenged statutes were based on "archaic
and overbroad generalizations." In Reed, the Idaho statute assumed that men
would be better estate administrators than women, while in Frontiero, it was as-
sumed that women, not men, were dependents. Id. at 506.
59. The dissent disagreed with the majority's decision to uphold the statute as
compensation for past discrimination. They noted that there could be no discrimi-
nation since "women do not compete directly with men for promotion in the
Navy." Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
61. The purpose of the Act was to give children an opportunity to enjoy the
personal attention of the remaining parent. The Court held, however, that there
Court gave little weight to the compensatory discrimination argu-
ment advanced in Kahn and Schlesinger by stating that "the
mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an auto-
matic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual
purposes underlying a statutory scheme." 62 The Court noted that,
in reality, the statute would not benefit certain classes of women.
Those without children and those whose children had grown to a
certain age would lose their benefits. The legislation, therefore,
did not justify these exceptions, given the statutory purpose.63
In 1976, the Court attempted to clear the confusion surrounding
invidious discrimination by introducing a middle-tier level of re-
view. In Craig v. Boren, 64 the Court established the "substantial
relationship" test requiring that "classifications by gender must
serve important government objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." 65 As in the case of
strict scrutiny analysis, the proponent of the classification has the
burden of rebutting a presumed unconstitutionality. 66
Califano v. Webster 67 provided the first opportunity for the
Court to apply the new substantial relationship test to benign
classifications. In Califano, the Court upheld a social security
statute giving women benefits at 62 years of age while requiring
men to reach the age of 65 for similar benefits. The main objec-
tion to the statute was that it permitted women to exclude three
years of salary from the calculation of their earnings average.
was no rational relationship between the classification and the purpose of the stat-
ute. Id. at 651-53.
62. Id. at 648 (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 649-51.
64. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of
3.2% beer to males under 21 years of age while permitting females over 18 to
purchase it was held unconstitutional. The state offered a variety of statistical
surveys intended to demonstrate a close relationship between gender and alcohol-
related traffic accidents in defense of the the discriminatory classification. The
Court rejected the evidence as establishing "an unduly tenuous 'fit.'" Id. at 202.
The Court further noted that "[t]he very social stereotypes that find reflection in
age differential laws . . . are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of these
comparative statistics. Hence 'reckless' young men who drink and drive are trans-
formed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously
escorted home." Id. at 202 n.14 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 197 (emphasis added). Applying the new standard, the Court found
the state's showing inadequate to prove that "sex represents a legitimate, accurate
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving." Id. at 204.
66. Id. at 199-200. The substantial relationship test struck a compromise for
those favoring a recognition of sex as a suspect classification. However, the mid-
dle-level test would produce fewer fatalities in gender challenges than the strict
scrutiny required of suspect classifications since an important governmental pur-
pose may be easier to establish than a compelling governmental purpose. Addi-
tionally, the government need only prove that the means used were substantially
related instead of necessary to achieve the government objectives.
67. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
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This permitted them to ignore three additional years of lower in-
come than could be excluded for a male. "[A]llowing women,
who as such have been unfairly hindered from earning as much
as men, to eliminate additional low-earning years from the calcu-
lation of their retirement benefits works directly to remedy some
of the effect of past discrimination." 68 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that when legislation directly addresses discrimination
and attempts to remedy it, disparate treatment of the sexes for
such a limited basis is constitutional.69 The Court in Califano
distinguished between two types of compensatory discrimination.
The first type was adopted by the legislature for remedial reasons
and the second type was based on traditional stereotypes. The
Court held only the former tolerable. 70
The distinction made in Califano regarding compensatory dis-
crimination 71 was a significant factor in the Court's declaration
that gender-based alimony statutes are unconstitutional in Orr v.
Orr.7 2 In Orr, a divorced man successfully challenged an Ala-
bama statute73 requiring husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony.
Because the statute failed to address and remedy specific dis-
crimination,74 it was held unconstitutional, thereby invalidating a
form of compensatory discrimination based on traditional stereo-
types75 and reinforcing the Califano rationale.76 Furthermore,
68. Id. at 318. The important governmental purpose articulated was a direct
reduction in the "disparity in economic condition between men and women." Id.
at 317.
69. Id. at 320. Soon after the Equal Pay Act and Title VII were enacted, Con-
gress phased out this disparity by extending the three-year exclusion to men. See
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See also Ginsburg, Women,
Equality, and the Bakke Case, 4 Crv. LIB. REV. 8, 13 (1977).
70. See Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classifications in the Context of
Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813, 823 (1978), for a summary of the court decisions in this
area.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
72. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
73. ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-51 to -53 (1975).
74. 440 U.S. at 278-79. In applying the substantial relationship test articulated
in Craig (supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text), the Court found that the stat-
ute failed to serve an important state objective. The asserted purpose of helping
needy spouses and compensating for past discrimination against women was re-
jected since women had not been significantly discriminated against in the sphere
to which the statute applied. Id.
Women have been given preferential treatment under alimony laws premised
on stereotypes and the assumption of their dependency. See generally Podell,
Peck & First, Custody - To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L REV. 51, 52 (1972).
75. The Court recognized that benign gender-based classifications "carry the
inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and
where "the State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are
as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gen-
der classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual
stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis
of sex." 7
7
While the Court during the 1970's consistently recognized the
distinction between invalid classifications that reflect traditional
stereotypes 78 and those which provide a legitimate preferential
treatment as a remedy for specific past discrimination, 79 the Jus-
tices have rarely been in agreement as to which classification is
present. This has resulted in a sharply divided Court in past dis-
crimination cases. 80 Although the majority has regularly applied
middle-level review to gender classifications since 1976, the close
vote in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan8' demon-
strates a delicate allegiance to the heightened scrutiny in benign
gender-based discrimination cases.
IV. THE HOGAN CASE
The majority in Hogan adhered to the standards and rationales
promulgated in its prior holdings of the late 1970's and early
1980's. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the majority quickly
classified the equal protection challenge as one involving a gen-
der-based classification.8 2 In doing so, the Court applied the cor-
responding intermediate level of review originally set forth in
Craig v. Boren83 and re-emphasized in Wengler v. Druggists Mu-
their need for special protection" and, therefore, "must be carefully tailored" to
avoid negative affects. 440 U.S. at 283.
76. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
77. 440 U.S. at 283.
78. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (role of surviving parent
in child rearing).
79. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1974) (discrimination in mili-
tary job opportunities).
80. Two distinct judicial fronts have developed with Justices Brennan and
Marshall representing one, and Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger repre-
senting the other. While split opinions are traditional in the Supreme Court, such
a consistent split is rare. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in dissent a total
of 24 times on constitutional issues during the 1980-81 term. Additionally, the
Court has split in over fifteen of its gender-based challenges. See, e.g., Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (5 to 4 decision); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977) (5 to 4 decision); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1974) (5 to 4
decision). Only Reed, Wiesenfeld, and Webster had no dissenting opinions. See
also Kelso, Justice O'Connor Replaces Justice Stewart: What Effect on Constitu-
tional Cases?, 13 PAC. L.J. 259, 263-64 (1982).
81. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (5 to 4 decision).
82. Id. at 723-24.
83. 429 U.S. 190. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this case.
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tual Insurance Co.84 Uniquely confronted with a discriminatory
challenge by a male rather than a female, the Court maintained
that this difference "does not exempt [the statute] from scrutiny
or reduce the standard of review."85 Thus, the majority predicated
its decision-making process on the concept of total equality for
both men and women. The Court subsequently applied the mid-
dle-level two-part test.86
A. Part 1 - Identifying Important Government Objectives
Mississippi justified its single-sex admissions policy as affirma-
tive action which compensated for past discrimination against wo-
men by providing them a greater range of educational
opportunities. 87 But because the nursing profession has histori-
cally been dominated by women, the Court held that the state
could not show a need for remedial compensation.88 "It is readily
apparent that a State can evoke a compensatory purpose to jus-
tify an otherwise discriminatory classification only if members of
the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disad-
vantage related to the classification."89 Thus, the purported pur-
pose could only have been "the mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose" rejected previously.90
The Court distinguished the facts in Hogan from Califano9l and
84. 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (holding that the classification must serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed be sub-
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives).
85. 458 U.S. at 723-24 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979); Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979)). In Caban v. Mohammed, the Court invalidated a
New York statute that did not permit the natural father of an illegitimate child to
block the adoption of that child. The same statute would permit the natural
mother to do so. In Orr, the Court invalidated a statute that required males to pay
alimony but imposed no similar requirement on females.
86. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text; see supra text accompanying
note 65.
87. 458 U.S. at 727-28.
88. The Court noted that in 1970, women earned 94 percent of the nursing bac-
calaureate degrees awarded in Mississippi and 98.6 percent of the degrees earned
nationwide. Id. at 729 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
EARNED DEGREES CONFERRED: 1969-1970 388 (1972)).
89. 458 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added).
90. See Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975). In that case, the Court ruled that
it need not accept the asserted legislative purpose when the legislative history and
scheme indicate that the purpose asserted could not have been the goal of the leg-
islation. Id. at n.16.
91. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
Schlesinger92 which involved constitutional statutes that reme-
died an actual disadvantage suffered by women. Not only did
Mississippi fail to establish any such prior disadvantage but, as
Justice O'Connor explained, "MUW's policy of excluding males
from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."93
Furthermore, it was noted that the American Nurses Association
claimed that the exclusion of men from the profession actually
served to depress nurses' wages.94 Therefore, the Court found no
important government objective for the gender-based admissions
policy.
B. Part 2 - The Means Must be Substantially Related
to the End
In holding the gender-based policy invalid, the majority ruled
that the state failed to show a substantial relationship between
the classification of an all-female admissions policy and its as-
serted objective of compensating women for past discrimination.95
The argument that prohibiting men from enrolling at MUW would
benefit women by providing an "all-female" environment was dis-
credited by the school's practice of allowing men to audit classes.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that MUW's practice of allowing men
to audit classes "fatally undermines its claim that women, at least
those in the School of Nursing, are adversely affected by the pres-
ence of men."96 While the force of this holding may be lost due to
the seemingly insignificant number of male auditors,97 the allow-
ance of men in class contradicts the asserted rationale of provid-
ing an "all-female" choice for women. The result would seem to
merely preclude men from actually earning a degree, thereby
eliminating male competition in the work force.
C. The Title IX Exception
In response to widespread gender-based discrimination in edu-
cation, Congress enacted Title IX98 which prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in any educational program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance. Mississippi contended that
its single-sex admissions policy was exempt from an equal protec-
92. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
93. 458 U.S. at 719 (footnotes omitted).
94. Id. at 729-30 n.15.
95. Id. at 730.
96. Id. 138 courses had been audited by men in the past decade while there
were 938 courses offered each year.
97. Id. at 744 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976) (Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972).
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tion challenge pursuant to section 901(a) (5) of Title IX99 which
excludes certain public institutions from coverage under the act if
they had remained exclusive to one sex from their inception. Jus-
tice O'Connor rejected any such exemption because of Congress'
limited power under section five of the fourteenth amendment. 00
"Congress' power under section five, however, 'is limited to adopt-
ing measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees.' "101 Citing Marbury v. Madison 0 2 and Younger v.
Harris, 10 3 the majority emphasized the supremacy of the United
States Constitution and recognized the need to invalidate any
conflicting statutes.104
D. Analysis of Hogan
Hogan presented the Court with a statute prohibiting males
from entering a state educational institution. Because the statute
was discriminatory on its face, the case provided an opportunity
for a natural and almost mechanical application of middle-level
scrutiny. The Supreme Court once again found itself divided over
which test to apply when examining a gender-based classification
statute. 05 Four Justices avoided what should have been a unani-
mous determination that the classification was unconstitu-
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (5) (1976). Section 1681(a) provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance, except that:
(5) in regards to admissions this section shall not apply to any public in-
stitution of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that
traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of
admitting only students of one sex.
Id.
100. Section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress broad power to
enforce the amendment and "to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect
equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against state denial or
invasion." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
101. 458 U.S. at 732 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10
(1966)).
102. 5 US. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
103. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). "[A] statute apparently governing a dispute cannot be
applied by judges, consistently with their obligations, when such an application of
the statute would conflict wit h the Constitution." Id. at 52.
104. 458 U.S. at 733.
105. See supra note 80.
tional.106 Similarly, in prior cases involving gender-based
challenges, these same Justices have clung to a theory favoring
benign discrimination, stretching the compensatory rationale to
its utmost limits, 10 7 in finding that women are not similarly situ-
ated,108 or in misplacing emphasis when applying the substantial
relationship test. 09 The facts in Hogan differed, however, thus
stripping the dissent of any possible rational justification. Still,
those Justices elected to deliver emotional arguments rather than
vote alongside a long-time opposition."10
In his dissent, Justice Powell first contended that heightened
scrutiny for gender-based discrimination was "designed to free
women from 'archaic and overbroad generalizations' "111 and thus
was inappropriate in this case. His reasoning focused on the need
to protect the expansion of women's choices. "In no previous case
have we applied [intermediate scrutiny] to invalidate state efforts
to expand women's choices."" 2 But the dissent ignored the fact
that men's choices were thereby limited, preferring instead to
rely on the ability of males to obtain the same education at other
state-run schools. 113 The dissent was more concerned with no-
tions of diversity and tradition"14 than providing for true equality.
106. As stated in the court of appeals decision, "the policy of admitting only fe-
males to MUW is an express gender-based discrimination." 646 F.2d at 1118.
107. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), in which the Court up-
held a statute which compensated women for past economic disparity by allowing
them to eliminate more low-earning years than men for purposes of computing So-
cial Security benefits. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), which upheld a statute ex-
cluding women from military draft. In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist
wrote: "Men and women, because of the combat restrictions on women, are simply
not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft." Id. at 78.
109. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). The majority,
including Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Powell, and
Blackmun, upheld the constitutionality of a California statutory rape law. In a dis-
sent joined by Justices White and Marshall, Justice Brennan expressed fear that
the majority had placed too much emphasis on the desirability of achieving the
state's asserted statutory goal of preventing unwanted pregnancies instead of ana-
lyzing whether the sex-based discriminatory statute was substantially related to
achieving that goal. The dissenters opted for a gender-neutral classification. Id. at
488.
110. See supra note 80. The establishment of the two "fronts" has also been
discussed in Cassen, Equal Protection-Equal Status: A Summary of Sex Discrim-
ination Cases Since Frontiero, 11 LINcoLN L. REV. 167, 192 (1980).
111. 458 U.S. at 740 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1974)).
112. 458 U.S. at 740.
113. Id. at 740-41. The majority pointed out that Hogan could have enrolled in
another state-supported coeducational program, but would have had to drive a
considerable distance from his Columbia residence, thereby sacrificing his em-
ployment opportunities. Id. at 741 n.8.
114. "In sum, the practice of voluntarily chosen single-sex education is an
honored tradition in our country, even if it now rarely exists in state colleges and
universities.... A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for
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As Justice O'Connor noted, a similarly situated female would not
have been placed in the precarious position of choosing between
foregoing school credit or traveling to another school.115 "The pol-
icy of denying males the right to obtain credit toward a baccalau-
reate degree thus imposed upon Hogan 'a burden he would not
bear were he female.' ",116 Therein lies the distinction between
the majority and the dissent: Justice Powell suggesting that the
Court should not demand strict equality at the cost of reducing
freedom of choice, and Justice O'Connor deciding that any une-
qual treatment of the sexes is invalid, absent substantial
justification.117
The dissent's rationale of upholding a statute based on tradition
and diversity is both historically unsound and illogical. By pro-
viding one sex with more opportunities at the expense of the
other, Justice Powell's approach would effectively deteriorate any
inroads of progress advanced by the modern equal protection
analysis.
Justice Powell's dissent also criticizes the majority for invali-
dating a statute on behalf of one man who does not represent an
indentifiable class and whose primary concern is simply personal
convenience."l8 These arguments are tenuous, to say the least.
Hogan challenged a provision which discriminated against all
men, and the fourteenth amendment sets no limitations on "who"
can challenge the statute.1 9 Furthermore, regardless of personal
convenience, the fact remains that Hogan and others similarly sit-
uated were denied an opportunity afforded to women without
existence of a qualifying or legitimate reason.120 Carrying out tra-
dition as a governmental purpose has never held much weight in
the courts; otherwise, women would still be barred from, among
other things, practicing law, tending bar, and serving on juries.12'
Additionally, equal protection does not bar private organizations
diversity.. . . It is the essence of our democratic system." Id. at 744-54 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. at 723-24 n.8.
116. Id. (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979)).
117. Id. at 731 n.17.
118. Id. at 741-42 (Powell, J., dissenting).
119. "No State shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
120. The majority in Hogan held that the statute failed both parts of the sub-
stantial relationship (middle-level) test. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying
text for the Court's application of the test.
121. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
and institutions from adhering.to traditions and offering diversity
in educational opportunities for a single sex.122
V. IMPACT
Although the majority in Hogan confined its holding to the
nursing school challenge,123 the decision has considerable signifi-
cance for future benign, gender-discrimination cases. The Hogan
Court maintained that a strict application of intermediate scru-
tiny is necessary for all discriminatory classifications regardless
of any alleged motivations. A gender-based classification that ad-
dresses and remedies forms of specific discrimination remains
constitutionally valid. The Hogan decision further clarifies the
distinction between redressing a past wrong and invalidly at-
tempting to reinforce traditional stereotypes by the recitation of a
benign purpose. 24
Hogan pushes the Court toward an equal status treatment and
away from a protective, compensatory rationale. This trend is of
utmost importance because it is clear that the use of a middle-
level analysis is only marginally effective as long as the Court
may continually resort to compensatory discrimination as a justi-
fication for gender classifications. Additionally, the intermediate
standard has been applied differently in previous cases when wo-
men were harmed 125 and when they were benefited. 126 As Justice
Stewart commented, "It]he female of the species has the best of
both worlds. She can attack laws that unreasonably discriminate
against her while preserving those that favor her."127
122. Congress excluded preschool, secondary, and private undergraduate
schools from Title IX's admissions coverage. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1976).
Congress based its decision on the importance of educational variety and freedom
of choice. It believed Title IX would unnecessarily restrict the right of private
schools to control their character. 117 CONG. REc. 39, 248-49 (1971) (remarks of
Rep. Ledenborn); id. at 39, 453-54 (remarks of Rep. Conte).
123. 458 U.S. at 733. The Court's holding was narrowly tailored: "Because we
conclude that the State's policy of excluding males from MUW's School of Nursing
violates the Equal Protection Clause. . . ." Id.
124. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (statute giving husband
exclusive right to transfer or encumber community property held invalid);
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (social security statute that provides assist-
ance to a family when the father is unemployed violates the due process clause
when it makes no similar provision for the unemployed mother).
126. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (natural mother could consent
to adoption of illegitimate child but natural father could not intervene); Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (men required to pay alimony despite finding that the wife was the
party at fault, and the failure to include a provision for the wife's payment of ali-
mony under any circumstances).
127. Justice Potter Stewart was quoted during informal talks with students.
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CoNN.
L. REv. 813, 818 n.32 (1978) (citing Harv. L. Sch. Rec., Mar. 23, 1973, at 15).
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Hogan also points out the necessity of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) 128 to establish genuine equality for both men
and women. The ERA would constitutionally classify gender-
based classifications as inherently suspect, thereby effectively pre-
cluding any discrimination regardless of state motivations or
objectives.129 While opponents130 of the ERA argue that the same
or even superior results may be achieved through the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the adoption of a ju-
dicial classification of gender-based treatment as a suspect
category would give equality to men and women, yet leave a back
door open for discrimination which serves a compelling state in-
terest.13 ' However, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a defi-
nite unwillingness to treat gender as a suspect class, at least for
the present. 32 The continual split opinion, with Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist opposing Justices Brennan and
Marshall in over fifteen gender-based decisions, has occurred
once again in Hogan, this time without justification or reason.
When four members of the Court struggle in applying even mid-
dle-level scrutiny, the urgency of the ERA as an alternative be-
comes apparent. Pending its adoption, however, it is crucial that
128. The Equal Rights Amendment, which the states recently failed to ratify,
provided: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972).
129. For arguments in support of this proposition, see Brown, Emerson, Falk, &
Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 880-81 (1971). But see Mendelson, ERA, The Supreme
Court, and Allegations of Gender Bias, 44 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1979) (contending that
the ERA would provide no more protection against gender discrimination than is
already available under the fourteenth amendment).
130. Some opponents of the ERA fear a far-reaching effect on private lives. See,
Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
234, 234-38 (1971). However, where purely private action is involved, the ERA
would be inapplicable as it prohibits only governmental discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex. See supra note 128.
131. Suspect classifications may be upheld when the state demonstrates an
overriding or compelling interest which cannot be achieved by a more carefully
tailored legislative classification. See Developments, supra note 5.
132. In a concurring opinion in Frontiero, Justice Powell pointed out the inap-
propriateness of making gender a suspect class during the pendency of the Equal
Rights Amendment's ratification. Powell warned that "democratic institutions are
weakened, and confidence in the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we ap-
pear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political impor-
tance at the very time they are under consideration within the prescribed
constitutional processes." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
at least a majority of the Court combine to strengthen and rein-
force an objective application of intermediate scrutiny. Such an
application occurred in Hogan.
It is appropriate that Justice O'Connor's first authored opinion
should be one which strikes out at role stereotyping and archaic
views of the proper relationship for men and women in American
society. While it may be difficult to ascertain the impact of the
first woman justice on this case, 133 it is unmistakably evident that
her position on the Supreme Court epitomizes the vast changes in
the social and legal position of women. Hopefully, her presence
will shed new light on freely chosen role-changes and role-combi-
nations in a Court where sexual prejudice has been expressed as
frequently through benevolent blindness as through an exagger-
ated awareness of the differences between men and women.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the "middle-tier" equal protection analysis, as opposed to
the traditional minimum scrutiny test, is a step forward for sexual
equality, it has still fostered uncertainty in the law and allowed
considerable latitude in the disparate treatment of the sexes.
With the floundering ratification of the ERA and the refusal of the
Court to treat gender as a suspect category, further advancements
for sexual equality are dependent on consistent and rigorous ap-
plications of middle-level scrutiny. Hogan exemplified such an
approach, applied in a manner free from the traditional stereo-
types that stand as a barrier to equality between men and wo-
men. This unequivocal method of gender-discrimination review is
essential to meet this generation's challenge to help bring about
true equality in our laws.
MARY ELLEN SHULL
133. See generally Kelso, supra note 80, at 263-64 for a discussion of Justice
O'Connor's possible impact in this area.
